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TORT LAW-The Application of the Rescue Doctrine
Under Comparative Negligence Principles:
Govich v. North American Systems, Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The primary purpose of the tort system is to ensure fair compensation
to victims of negligent conduct.' Courts have utilized different approaches
in accomplishing this goal. Prior to the adoption of comparative negligence
in New Mexico, courts often placed limitations on the defense of contributory negligence. Such limitations included the doctrines of last clear
chance, assumption of the risk, violation of a safety statute, and the
rescue doctrine. Whereas these limitations formally precluded the use of
contributory negligence as a defense, with the adoption of comparative
negligence in New Mexico these once-settled issues of negligence law have
become open questions. The New Mexico Supreme Court recently addressed whether comparative negligence abrogates the rescue doctrine.
In Govich v. North American Systems, Inc. ,2 the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that the rescue doctrine, which imposes "an independent duty
of care owed a rescuer by persons creating unreasonable risks of harm
to others," is applicable under comparative negligence principles.' Justice
Ransom reasoned that the rescue doctrine now serves only to establish
duty of care owed by the person creating the peril to
the independent
4
the rescuer.
This casenote will examine the Govich decision and compare the court's
analysis of the application of the rescue doctrine to comparative negligence
with other jurisdictions' interpretation of the issue. Further, this note
will examine how the Govich decision is consistent with other New Mexico
decisions which have not eliminated traditional negligence defenses, but
have recognized them as "liability concepts based on or related to negligence of either plaintiff, defendant or both." 5
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In Scott v. Rizzo,6 the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the decision
of the court of appeals, establishing the "pure" form of comparative
negligence in New Mexico. Under the "pure" form, a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery, but damages are diminished
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to him by the

1. See generally WftLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 1, 42 (4th ed. 1971).
2. 112 N.M. 226, 814 P.2d 94 (1991).
3. Id. at 232, 814 P.2d at 100.
4. Id.
5. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 687, 634 P.2d 1234, 1239 (1981).
6. Id. at 689, 634 P.2d at 1239.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

factfinder. 7 The court in Scott recognized that the adoption of comparative
negligence would have ramifications on existing contributory negligence
defenses designed to ameliorate the harshness of the rule of contributory
negligence. The court stated that:
[w]e are of the opinion that existing decisions, both in New Mexico
and in thirty-five other jurisdictions in this country, provide sufficient
guidelines to permit our New Mexico trial courts to adapt and apply
the comparative negligence philosophy to actual controversies and
specific factual circumstances, as they arise.'
The question of whether the rescue doctrine, a contributory negligence
defense, still applies with the adoption of comparative negligence arose
in Govich.
Generally, there is no duty under Anglo-American law to lend personal
assistance to persons in distress, nor is there a duty to warn of imminent
danger. 9 However, in order to prevent the harsh results of a defense of
contributory negligence in a rescue attempt, and to encourage people to
assist others in need, the courts developed the rescue doctrine. The rescue
principle holds that, where a defendant has created a situation of peril
for a victim, the defendant will be liable to a rescuer of the victim for
any injury he may incur in the rescue.' 0 The rescue doctrine allows a
rescuer to maintain an action, which might otherwise be barred by the
doctrine of contributory negligence, as long as the rescuer's behavior
does not rise to the level of rash or reckless." The tortfeasor's duty of
of that owed to the victim because
care owed to the rescuer is independent
2
rescuers as a class are foreseeable.'
The paradigmatic case establishing the rescue doctrine was Wagner v.
InternationalRailway Co.'3 In Wagner, the plaintiff was seriously injured
in an attempt to rescue his cousin who had been thrown from a moving
train as a result of the defendant railway company's negligence. The
plaintiff lost at trial and an intermediate appellate court directed a
judgment on the verdict for the defendant. The court of appeals reversed
an intermediate court's grant of summary judgment for the railway. In
so doing, the Wagner court rejected the railway's principal arguments
that: (1) the plaintiff's rescue attempt of his cousin was outside the
causation chain; and (2) the plaintiff's rescue attempt was a "wanton

7. Id.
8. Id. at 688-89, 634 P.2d at 1240-41.
9. Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV.
423 (1985). There are currently five situations in which the courts impose a duty to render aid.
They include: (1) a duty imposed by statute; (2) a special relationship; (3) a contract; (4) one who
injures or imperils another, who has a duty to render reasonable care; and (5) one who volunteers
aid has a duty to exercise reasonable care. Id.
10. J. Tiley, The Rescue Principle, 30 MOD. L. REV. 25 (1967).
11. See 57 AM. JtR. 2D Negligence § 418 (1971).
12. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 44, at 308 (5th ed.
1984).
13. 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
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exposure to a danger that was useless" and was thus contributorily
negligent. 4 In a frequently quoted passage, Justice Cardozo wrote:
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief.
The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct
to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their
efforts within the range of the natural and probable. The wrong that
imperils life is a wrong to the imperilled victim; it is a wrong also
to his rescuer. 5
The Wagner rule has enjoyed universal acceptance.' 6 A major exception
to the rule, however, is that "professional rescuers [such as firemen and
policemen] may not recover for injuries flowing from risks inherent in
the act of rescue."' 7 Even so, one commentator has observed that "Wagner
and its progeny represent a transformation in the doctrine of contributory
negligence through expansion of traditional notions of foreseeability and
causation in order to reach a fair result on the ultimate question of
recovery for rescuers."'"
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Roane Govich and her hearing-impaired adult son, Daniel, returned
home one evening to find smoke emerging from their house. 19 Daniel's
dog, an animal specially trained to alert Daniel to everyday routine sounds,
was inside the burning house. Daniel called the dog from the outside of
the house, but the dog did not come; consequently, he entered the house
in an attempt to rescue the dog. Upon seeing Daniel enter the house,
Roane made several entrances attempting to restrain Daniel. The dog
died, and both Daniel and his mother sustained injuries as a result of
the fire. Daniel testified that "at the time of the rescue attempt of my
dog I was under severe emotional distress due to the possibility of losing
my dog and not knowing if all my possessions in the house would be
destroyed. "20
The Goviches brought a personal injury action against the manufacturer
of a coffee maker, which they claimed caused the fire through a defect.
Based upon theories of negligence, strict products liability, and breach
of express or implied warranties, the Goviches sought damages for personal
injuries, emotional distress, and lost wages. Mr. Coffee, the manufacturer
of the coffee maker, and Ark-Les, the maker of an electrical component
of the appliance, moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the
personal injury claims. The Goviches claimed that the rescue doctrine

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 438.
Id. at 457.
Govich, 112 N.M. at 231, 814 P.2d at 99.
Ross A. Albert, Restitutionary Recovery for Rescuers, 74 CAL. L. REV. 85, 91-92 (1986).
Id.
Govich, 112 N.M. at 228, 814 P.2d at 96.
Id.
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precluded the granting of summary judgment. 21 The district court granted
the partial summary judgment and dismissed the Goviches' personal injury
claims. The court determined that the injuries caused to the Goviches
"resulted entirely from their entry into the burning house," and that
Daniel's actions of entering a burning home to rescue a dog were "unreasonable conduct as a matter of law."2 The court also concluded that
Roane Govich's actions in entering the house were "plainly occasioned
of her son and not any act, omission or
by the unreasonable conduct
'2
conduct of defendants."
The Goviches filed a notice of appeal from the district court's order
dismissing their personal injury claims. 24 The New Mexico Supreme Court
reversed the order holding that the rescue doctrine is applicable under
hold that the
comparative negligence.25 The supreme court declined to
26
rescue of property is unforeseeable as a matter of law.
IV.

DISCUSSION

Other jurisdictions have examined the effect of comparative negligence
on the rescue doctrine. The general rule adopted in comparative fault
jurisdictions with respect to rescue cases is that the factfinder should
compare the fault of the rescuer (plaintiff) with that of the creator of
the situation to which the rescue was a response (defendant).
The court in Allison v. Sverdrup & Parcel & Assoc., Inc.27 reversed
a judgment in which the jury found the decedent 100% at fault, holding
that the trial judge committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct the
jury on the rescue doctrine. The plaintiff's decedent had entered a gas-2
filled bin in an attempt to rescue a co-worker who had been asphyxiated.
The plaintiff's decedent also died from asphyxiation from carbon monoxide poisoning. 29 The issue was the applicability of comparative fault
to the rescue doctrine. The defendant claimed that the deceased helped
to create the situation and thus could not recover under the rescue doctrine.
The Missouri Court of Appeals stated that:
[w]e find no logical reason why, under our "pure" comparative fault
system, a rescuer's negligence in contributing to create a situation of
peril that summons him to the aid of one imperiled should not be
compared to the negligence of the defendant in contributing to the
creation of the peril. The law places a premium on the preservation
of human life and one who attempts the laudable act of saving life,

21. Id. The Goviches also responded that summary judgment was precluded by bystander recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but that theory was abandoned on appeal. Id.
22. Id.

23. Id. at 229, 814 P.2d at 97.
24. Id.

25. Id. at 232, 814 P.2d at 100.
26. Id. at 233, 814 P.2d at 101.

27. 738 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
28. Id. at 448.
29. Id.
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even though he is partly responsible for having endangered it, should
not be denied recovery.30
The court then analyzed other decisions in other jurisdictions and
determined that a rescuer will not be charged with negligence in a rescue
unless he or she acts "recklessly or rashly." 3 ' If the trier of fact concludes
that the rescuer has acted recklessly or rashly, the negligence of the
rescuer is compared with that of the one whose negligence caused the
predicament. The rescuer is then entitled only to the portion of damages
2
attributable to the defendant's conduct in creating the situation.1
The rescue doctrine applies under Connecticut's comparative negligence
statute, regardless of whether the plaintiff-rescuer contributed to the
victim's peril. In Zimny v. Cooper-JarrettInc. ,3 the plaintiff's decedent
was struck by a vehicle while attempting to help her mother out of the
car after being involved in a multiple-car accident. The court examined
the application of the rescue doctrine in view of comparative negligence
and held that if a rescue attempt is unreasonable, the rescuer should not
be barred from recovering, but the amount of recovery should be reduced
"by the degree to which he is comparatively negligent." '3 4 The court
noted that the effect of the rescue doctrine under comparative negligence
principles is different than under contributory negligence in that the rescue
doctrine no longer serves the purpose of eliminating the absolute defense
of contributory negligence.
Holding it proper to apply comparative negligence principles to rescue
cases, the court in Sweetman v. State Highway Department3 5 stated that
it perceived "no harsh result from the application of comparative negligence principles to rescue cases." 36 The case arose when the plaintiff
was injured while attempting to aid a motorist that had skidded on ice
and collided with a bridge guard rail. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was negligent in the construction and improper design of the
highway.
The Sweetman court described a two-step analysis in applying the rescue
doctrine. The first step requires a determination of whether the rescue
itself is reasonable. 37 This step requires the trier of fact to balance the
utility of the rescuer's conduct against the magnitude of the increased
risk of harm.3 The second step requires a determination of whether the
rescuer carried out the rescue attempt in a reasonable manner.3 9 If the

30. Id. at 451.
31. Id. at 454.

32. Id.
33. 513 A.2d 1235 (Conn. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 516 A.2d 887 (Conn. 1986).
34. Id.at 1243.
35. 357 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).

36. Id. at 789.
37. Id.

38. Id.
39. Id.
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rescuer did not, then the rescuer's recovery is reduced by his comparative
degree of fault. In light of the replacement of contributory negligence
with comparative negligence, any negligence by the plaintiff in carrying
out a rescue attempt will reduce his damages. °
The court in Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Korte4' concluded that, in
spite of Florida's abolition of the rule of contributory negligence, there
was no reason why comparative negligence should not apply in a rescue
case.4 2 The court described the rescue doctrine as previously serving a
dual purpose. First, the doctrine established the "causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury. '43 Second,
the doctrine eliminated the absolute defense of contributory negligence."
Although the doctrine was no longer needed to eliminate the absolute
defense of contributory negligence, the court stated that "the rescue
doctrine is still applicable to establish that the defendant's negligence was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. ' 45 However, the court held
that if a plaintiff is negligent in performing a rescue, he should only
recover "that portion of the entire damages sustained by him as the
defendant's negligence bears to the combined negligence of both the
plaintiff and the defendant."
In Govich, the New Mexico Supreme Court examined the effect of
comparative negligence on the rescue doctrine. The court held that the
rescue doctrine is applicable under comparative negligence principles. The
court first recognized that the doctrine has previously been utilized for
three purposes:
(1) to establish the duty owed the rescuer by the person creating the
peril; (2) to relieve the plaintiff of the defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk, otherwise available to the
person creating the initial peril; and (3) to help establish the causal
47
nexus between the defendant's negligence and the rescuer's injury.
The court concluded that the doctrine in New Mexico "now serves only
Unlike the courts
to establish and identify the duty owed the rescuer."
in several other jurisdictions, the New Mexico Supreme Court declined
to hold that the rescue doctrine establishes that the negligence precipitating
the rescue is in law the proximate cause of the rescuer's injuries.4 9 The
court believed it is more "direct" to rely on the jury's allocation of
fault under the traditional rules of proximate and independent intervening
causation, and stated that "[we] are aware of no public policy that would

40. Id.; see also Solomon v. Shuell, 457 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. 1990).
41. 357 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
42. Id. at 230.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Govich, 112 N.M. at 232, 814 P.2d at 100 (citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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compel us to remove from the jury questions of negligence and proximate
cause. 50
Instead of establishing the nexus between the defendant's negligence
and the rescuer's injury, the doctrine in New Mexico now simply serves
the purpose of "imposing an independent duty of care owed a rescuer
by persons creating unreasonable risks of harm to others . . . . "I' The
independent duty is owed to any foreseeable rescuer by the tortfeasor
regardless2 of whether the rescuer is an initial rescuer or a subsequent
5
rescuer.
The court held that the standard of rescuers is the same as the standard
of care in all cases; that is, "ordinary care under the circumstances." 5 3
The court declined to adopt a "rash or reckless" standard of care,
reasoning that New Mexico courts never have recognized degrees of
negligence.14 The jury is to consider all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case and to measure the rescuer's actions in accordance
with the standards of reasonableness and ordinary care. 5
Additionally, the court declined to hold that the rescue of property is
unforeseeable as a matter of law .16 Instead, the court determined that
the issue was a question for the jury.5 7 Although some courts hold that
there is no causal connection between a defendant's negligence which
endangers property and an injury incurred by a person
who tries to save
58
the property, many cases support the contrary view.
V.

ANALYSIS

The court's holding in Govich coincides with the reasoning in Scott
v. Rizzo. In Scott, the supreme court recognized that the adoption of
comparative negligence principles would have an effect on other existing
doctrines. The court did not make an "effort to catalog or determine
how various rules will be affected by the comparative negligence doctrine,"
but rather determined that adoptions would be made on a "case-by-case
basis." 59 The Scott court stated that "[o]ur purpose is to emphasize that
if negligence or negligence-related concepts are a basis for liability, the
comparative negligence doctrine applies, and common sense will assist in
its fair application."60

50. Id. at 233-34, 814 P.2d at 101-02.
51. Id. at 232, 814 P.2d at 100.
52. Id. at 233, 814 P.2d at 101.
53. Id.
54. Id. The court also noted that the majority of comparative negligence jurisdictions have
adopted a "reasonableness" standard. Id. n.4. But see Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234
(1981) (abolishing degrees of negligence).
55. Govich, 112 N.M. at 233, 814 P.2d at 101.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence §§ 1083-84 (1971).
59. Scott, 96 N.M. at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240.
60. Id.
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After examining the effect of comparative negligence on the rescue
doctrine, the Govich court concluded that although the doctrine serves
to establish causation in other jurisdictions, the doctrine's use in New
Mexico will be limited to establishing the duty owed to the rescuer. 6'
Specifically, Justice Ransom stated that:
[slo far as the rescue doctrine can be understood as shorthand for
a public policy, reflected in the law, imposing an independent duty
of care owed a rescuer by persons creating unreasonable risks of harm
to others, we think that facet of the doctrine remains vital under
New Mexico's comparative negligence regime. 62
According to the court, the duty "arises from a policy, deeply imbedded
in our social fabric, that fosters rescue attempts. ' 63 In holding that the
rescue doctrine imposes a duty of independent care, the court recognized
that a relationship exists between the rescuer and the tortfeasor by which
the defendant was legally obliged to protect the interest of the plaintiff.
Although Justice Ransom cited Calkins v. Cox Estates" for the proposition stating that whether a duty is owed is a matter of law to be
decided by the court, he diverged from the Calkins majority opinion in
the analysis of whether a duty exists. Instead of examining whether the
"injured party was a foreseeable plaintiff-that he was within the zone
of danger created by respondent's actions ...
65 as the Calkins duty
analysis requires, Justice Ransom instead relied solely on a legal policy
determination. Despite a similar outcome, his analysis was different.
By declining to establish that the "negligence precipitating the rescue
is in law the proximate cause of the rescuer's injuries,"' 6 the court
reinforced the power of the jury to decide issues of causation rather
than reassign it to itself. The jury must determine if the injury to the
plaintiff "was a foreseeable result of respondent's breach." ' 67
It is in the proximate cause analysis that the jury determines whether
the actions of the rescuer were not a foreseeable result of an earlier act
by the defendant; that is, if the event "interrupts and turns aside a
course of events and produces that which was not foreseeable as a result
of an earlier act or omission," then the later act is deemed an independent
intervening cause and the defendant's action is not the proximate cause

61. Govich, 112 N.M. at 232, 814 P.2d at 100.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 110 N.M. 59, 792 P.2d 36 (1990). In Calkins, the supreme court explored the duty of a
landowner to maintain a common area. The supreme court held that:
[a] plaintiff must show that defendant's actions constituted a wrong against him,
not merely that defendant acted beneath a required standard of care and that
plaintiff was injured thereby. He must show that a relationship existed by which
the defendant was legally obliged to protect the interest of plaintiff. This concept
limits liability for negligent conduct-a potential plaintiff must be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant because of defendant's actions.
Id. at 62, 792 P.2d at 39.
65.Id. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38.
66. Govich, 112 N.M. at 232, 814 P.2d at 100.
67. Calkins, 110 N.M. at 61, 792 P.2d at 38.
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of the plaintiff's injuries. 68 Therefore, if the jury finds the rescuer's
behavior to be so unreasonable as to preclude apportionment of fault
to the original wrongdoer, the rescue attempt is an independent intervening
cause, thus cutting off all of the defendant's liability at the proximate
cause stage.
The decision in Govich is consistent with the supreme court's application
of comparative negligence principles to suits sounding in negligence wherever possible. Several recent decisions illustrate the court's desire to do
so. In Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp.,69 the New Mexico Supreme Court
overruled cases that "appear to have held the duty to avoid unreasonable
risk of injury to others is satisfied by an adequate warning ...."70 The

court stated that "[a] risk is not made reasonable simply because it is
made open and obvious to persons exercising ordinary care. '' 7
The plaintiff in Klopp argued that the open and obvious danger rule
set forth in Uniform Jury Instruction 13-131072 was, in essence, a con-

tributory negligence bar to her cause of action and thus that the instruction
was incompatible with the doctrine of comparative negligence. The court
held that, under principles of comparative fault, it was not appropriate73
to submit the case to the jury under the current uniform jury instruction.

According to the court, it is the jury's position to determine in almost
all cases "whether a dangerous condition on the premises involved 'an
unreasonable risk of danger to a business visitor' and whether the occupier
'should reasonably anticipate that the business will not discover or realize

the [obvious] danger."'

74

The court cited other jurisdictions which had

danger doctrine because of the
also abolished the open and obvious
75
adoption of comparative negligence.
Similarly, in Lopez v. Ski Apache Resort,76 the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that the doctrine of comparative negligence applies to actions

68. aovich, 112 N.M. at 232, 814 P.2d at 100 (quoting N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIv.
13-306).
69. 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 293 (1992).
70. Id. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297.
71. Id.
72. N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1310 states:
An [owner] [occupant] owes a duty to a business visitor, with respect to known or obvious dangers,
ifand only if:
(1) The [owner] [occupant] knows or has reason to know of a dangerous condition
on his premises involving an unreasonable risk of danger to a business visitor; and
(2) The [owner] [occupant] should reasonably anticipate that the business visitor
will not discover or realize the danger [or that harm will result to the business
visitor, even though the business visitor knows or has reason to know of the danger].
If both of these conditions are found to exist, then the [owner] [occupant] had a duty to use
ordinary care to protect the business visitor from harm.
73. Klopp 113 N.M. at 159, 824 P.2d at 299.
74. Id. at 158, 824 P.2d at 298.
75. Id. (citing Harrison v. Taylor, 768 P.2d 1321 (Idaho 1989); Riddle v. McLouth Steel Prods.
Corp., 451 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. App. 1990), rev'd by Riddle v. McLouth Steel Products Corp, 485
N.W.2d 676 (Mich. 1992); Cox v. J.C. Penny Co., 741 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1987); Woolston v. Wells,
687 P.2d 144 (Or. 1984); Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978); Donahue
v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah App. 1989); O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo.
1985)).
, 836 P.2d 648, cert. denied, 113 N.M. 815, 833 P.2d 1181 (1992).
76. - N.M. __
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brought under the Ski Safety Act. 77 The factfinder is entitled to determine
the negligence, if any, of each of the parties. 78 In the event that both
parties are found to have negligently violated a duty under the Act,
contributing to the skier's injuries, fault and damages will be apportioned
79
between the parties under comparative negligence principles.
Another illustration of the court's desire to apply comparative negligence
principles is the case of Baxter v. Noce.80 The issue presented in Baxter
was whether an intoxicated passenger of a vehicle has a cause of action
against a tavern that served alcoholic beverages, allegedly in violation of
section 41-11-1 of the Dramshop Act. 8' The supreme court held that,
"[b]ecause contributory negligence no longer acts to absolutely extinguish
a plaintiff's right of recovery," the doctrine of complicity would not be
applied to bar completely an intoxicated person's recovery under the
Dramshop Act. 2 The court stated that, in adopting comparative negligence, "we supplanted the all-or-nothing bar of contributory negligence
and subjected the doctrine of assumption of risk and other concepts
based on the claimant's negligence to a comparative negligence analysis."3
VI.

CONCLUSION

The result reached in Govich is fair both to the plaintiff and to the
defendant. Whereas a rescuer was formerly allowed to recover 100% of
his or her damages as long as he or she did not act rashly or recklessly,
a rescuer's damages may now be reduced by the amount of his or her
own negligence. The result is fair and consistent with the principles of
comparative negligence in that each party remains responsible for his or
her own actions. Additionally, the court's recognition of an independent
duty of care owed by the person creating the peril to the rescuer will
help foster rescue attempts.
Clearly, the Govich decision has implications on other former defenses
to contributory negligence. After an analysis of the court's decision, it
is apparent that the court will find uses for existing doctrines if they
are consistent with social goals. Through a policy of apportioning damages
according to the relative fault of each party by applying comparative
negligence principles, the court accommodates the policy of compensating
victims of negligence while meeting the social need of encouraging members of society to accept accountability for their actions.
JENNIFER A. NOYA

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-15-1 to -14 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
Lopez, 836 P.2d at 654.
Id.
107 N.M. 48, 752 P.2d 240 (1988).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
Baxter, 107 N.M. at 51, 752 P.2d at 243.
Id.

